My research focuses on moral theory and moral epistemology. My dissertation examines genealogical arguments in moral theory, and develops a novel account of how realist theories in metaethics can be vindicated. Click here to read my dissertation abstract. If you'd like a copy of my entire dissertation, please contact me.
Click here to read my C.V.. Click here to read my research statement. Papers in Progress (drafts are available on request) “Hume’s Vindicatory Genealogy of Morals” While genealogical arguments about morality usually attempt to show how detailed etiological account of our moral beliefs will undermine our moral beliefs, Hume strikingly claims the opposite: that one’s sense of morals “must certainly acquire new force” when we reflect on its origins. I consider the nature of epistemic vindications, and I then offer an explanation of how Hume can defend his optimistic view about morality by looking at his account of the origins of justice. Hume’s account, I argue, offers genuine epistemic reasons for accepting the truth of many moral beliefs. I conclude by showing how insofar as Hume’s genealogy of morals is plausible, it can be used to defuse genealogically-based challenges to moral belief. “Debunking isn’t a Matter of Disagreement” Tomas Bogardus (2016) and Andreas Mogensen (2016) have both argued that evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism rest on an epistemological view called conciliationism. Conciliationists claim that it’s irrational to maintain confidence in a belief once you learn that an epistemic peer with equal evidence disagrees with you on some question. This version of the argument for evolutionary debunking then claims that our evolutionary counterparts could have easily formed different moral beliefs than ours. To challenge the argument that disagreements with distant evolutionary counterparts justify moral skepticism, I explain the motivations behind conciliationist views in epistemology, and I then explain how distant evolutionary counterparts cannot be treated as epistemic peers once we have understood the best reasons for accepting conciliationism. “Targeted Moral Debunking” Targeted debunking arguments attempt to use facts about the origins of moral beliefs to undercut the epistemic status of some but not all of our moral judgments. Against these arguments, Guy Kahane (2011) claims that appeals to evolutionary theory, insofar as they raise epistemic problems for our moral beliefs, will raise epistemic problems for all our moral beliefs. I examine Joshua Greene’s arguments for a targeted view of moral debunking, and show how Greene can sidestep Kahane’s argument that debunking arguments can only lead to moral skepticism. Not all is well for the targeted debunkers looking to defend consequentialism, however. I show that the central epistemic principle that protects the rationality Greene’s favored consequentialist judgments can also be used to defend non-consequentialist judgments. |